TY - JOUR
T1 - Collective action and other-regarding behavior
T2 - an assessment of games vs reality in Thailand
AU - Jarungrattanapong, Rawadee
AU - Boonmanunt, Suparee
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies and Springer Japan KK, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2020/10/1
Y1 - 2020/10/1
N2 - In social dilemmas where personal benefits are in conflict with collective benefits, there is an incentive for people to behave non-cooperatively as free-riders. However, everyday observation reveals seemingly unselfish behavior or so-called “other-regarding behavior,” which can be a motivation driving conservation decisions. This study presents evidence on how villagers behave in other-regarding games (the dictator game, trust game, and public good game), and how they behave in their actual collective actions in community conservation activities. Findings of the public good game had significant external validity with actual cooperative activities, suggesting that voluntary cooperation behavior plays a key role in real-life cooperative decision-making. However, none of the results of the answers to attitudinal trust questions provides any predictive value in estimating participation rates in conservation activities.
AB - In social dilemmas where personal benefits are in conflict with collective benefits, there is an incentive for people to behave non-cooperatively as free-riders. However, everyday observation reveals seemingly unselfish behavior or so-called “other-regarding behavior,” which can be a motivation driving conservation decisions. This study presents evidence on how villagers behave in other-regarding games (the dictator game, trust game, and public good game), and how they behave in their actual collective actions in community conservation activities. Findings of the public good game had significant external validity with actual cooperative activities, suggesting that voluntary cooperation behavior plays a key role in real-life cooperative decision-making. However, none of the results of the answers to attitudinal trust questions provides any predictive value in estimating participation rates in conservation activities.
KW - Collective action
KW - Cooperation
KW - External validity problem
KW - Lab-in-the-field experiment
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85079698320&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10018-020-00266-7
DO - 10.1007/s10018-020-00266-7
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85079698320
SN - 1432-847X
VL - 22
SP - 485
EP - 507
JO - Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
JF - Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
IS - 4
ER -
